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Abstract:  This paper works at the interface of the literature exploring the raison d’etre 
of the informal labor  market and that explaining the real exchange rate appreciations 
occurring in many Latin American countries during periods of reform. We first build a 
small country-Australian style model where the informal sector is seen as an unregulated 
non-tradables sector, augmented by heterogeneity in entrepreneurial ability and capital 
adjustment costs.  We then examine the behavior of the model with and without a formal 
sector rigidity. We show that the co-movements of relative formal/informal incomes, 
formal/informal sector size, and the real exchange rate can offer insight into the level of 
distortion in the labor market and the source of ER fluctuations.  We then explore time 
series data from Brazil, Colombia and Mexico using multivariate co-integration 
techniques to establish what “regime” each country is in at various periods of time. 
Mexico, for instance, appears to be relative undistorted and the 1987-92 appreciation 
appears to be largely a function of a boom in the non-tradables sector rather than wage 
inertia.  In spite of a secular expansion of the informal sector and there is little evidence 
of dualism or of a rigidity driven appreciation of the Real, from 1993-1996.  Post 1995 
Colombia corresponds to a classic segmented labor market and an appreciation partly 
driven by labor market rigidities. Graphical analysis suggests that neither the Argentine 
appreciation (1988-1992) or the celebrated Chilean appreciation (1975-1982) were driven 
by inertial forces.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper works at the interface of two literatures.  The first debates whether the 
unregulated or informal self-employed sector that accounts for often over 30% of LDC 
labor forces should be seen as the disadvantaged segment of a highly segmented labor 
market, or perhaps simply as an unregulated, largely voluntary, entrepreneurial sector.  
The issue is particularly important in light of the rise in the importance of the sector in 
the 1990s. The second literature debates whether the sources of the real exchange rate 
appreciations that were observed in the 1980 and 90s in many countries of Latin America 
were due to inertial considerations, such as backward indexation to inflation, or to “real” 
effects such as productivity shocks or booms in non-tradable demand.  The first question 
we propose can be answered by looking at the time series properties of relative sector 
sizes and relative remuneration of the formal salaried and informal self-employed sectors.   
Since the informal self-employed sector is largely non-tradable and unaffected by formal 
sector rigidities, these same time series properties can also help identify between models 
of the real exchange rate.   
  We begin by developing a model that combines Lucas’s (1978) idea of workers 
having differing levels of entrepreneurial ability, with a small economy trade model of 
the style most recently elaborated by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996).  In spirit we are similar 
to Aizenman and Frenkel (1988) in introducing heterogeneous ability, in our case varying 
entrepreneurial ability, to generate non-stationary behavior in relative tradable (formal) 
and non-tradable (informal self-employed) earnings. 
We also introduce capital adjustment costs consistent with the literature on credit 
as a barrier to entering self-employment (Evans and Jovanovic 1989) and more generally 
imperfect capital markets.  This corresponds to a more realistic view of barriers to entry 
into informality, and allows for transitory deviations of all variables from their steady 
state result without positing nominal wage rigidities in the formal sector (see for example 
Agenor and Aizenman 1999).  It also permits us to view the evolution of self-employed 
incomes as they are reported - a combination of return to capital and labor ability.  
Though the model cannot exhaust all possible patterns of comovements of relative 
sector sizes and incomes, and the real exchange rate, it does plausibly postulate several    2
core identifying relationships to motivate the empirical analysis that are robust to an array 
of parameter variables and to the modeled adjustment process.    The spirit of the exercise 
is to see how far we can go explaining the comovements of the three series without 
recourse to imposing rigidities. 
 
1.1 Background 
The traditional “dualistic” view sees the informal sector as the residual of highly 
distorted LDC labor markets. Unions or government regulation push wages above their 
equilibrium level, rationing workers into the inferior informal sector where they enjoy no 
labor protections.  However, an emerging literature argues that as a first approximation, 
this sector should be treated as an unregulated/unprotected entrepreneurial sector that 
may be desirable to many workers both because of the desire for independence and the 
misalignment of implicit and explicit labor taxes with perceived benefits. In this case, 
workers may be choosing to be their own bosses and though becoming unprotected, they 
reach a higher level of welfare. We argue here that both the “integrated” and 
“segmented” views should be seen as special cases of the same model: T he informal 
sector may very well be a prosperous non-tradables sector, but one which also contains 
involuntarily informal workers.  The relative shares of voluntary and involuntary worker 
will reflect the degree of segmentation in the labor market which can vary depending on 
the shocks to the economy.  
Empirically, in the absence of segmentation, we demonstrate that we should 
expect relative sector size and relative remuneration to move together across time.   
However, should formal sector rigidities become very binding, perhaps due to a negative 
shock to formal sector productivity, the overall composition of the sector can be shifted 
such that it behaves in the more traditional dualistic way: relative earnings move against 
relative sector size as workers rationed into the informal self-employed sector drive down 
their relative earnings.    
The difference of these two views also has the potential to shed light on the 
puzzling behavior of real exchange rates following liberalization in many Latin American 
countries.  In  the southern cone in the 1970s and in particular Chile, from 1979 to 1982, 
Mexico from 1988-1995, Argentina 1990-1995, and Brazil beginning in 1992, the   3
exchange rate appreciated, often dramatically following stabilization policies that fixed 
the nominal exchange rate and liberalized capital markets.
1  Loosely extending Calvo and 
Vegh’s (1994) typology, two types of explanations have emerged, those relying on 
backward-looking price and wage behavior (Rodriguez 1982, Dornbusch 1982, Edward 
and Cox- Edwards 1987, Calvo and Vegh 1994)
2 and those focusing on “real” 
phenomena arising from credibility problems (Calvo 1986, Calvo and Vegh 1993)  
wealth effects do either to falling inflation or expected productivity effects (Helpman and 
Razin 1987 Schmidt Hebbel 1988, Conley and Maloney 1995) or removing inflationary 
distortions (De Gregorio, Guidotti, and Vegh 1998,  Roldos 1997, Uribe 1997).  Central 
to the Chilean post-mortems of the early 1980s, this dichotomy between “inertial” 
(Dornbusch and Werner 1995, Edwards 1996) vs “real” (Carstens and Gil-Diaz 1996) 
explanations remained salient in the discussions of  the Mexican peso appreciation of the 
early 1990s, and  Rebelo and Vegh’s (1995) efforts to nest and evaluate competing 
theories of  post-stabilization behavior.        
The nature of the labor market data we work with here offers the potential to 
inform these debates.  First, the informal self-employed are concentrated in non-
tradables:  Argentina 87%, Brazil 92%, Chile 86%, Colombia 87%, Mexico 83%.  
Second, almost by  definition, their incomes are less affected by official regulations.  
These two characteristics make them ideal for analyzing exchange rate movements in the 
context of a small economy model, and the relative movement of relative informal/formal 
wages and sectors sizes and help identify the presence of formal sector rigidities, and 
inertial forces in exchange rate movements. 
As an example,  returning to the canonical Chilean case, figure 1, shows that in 
the 1960s and early 1970s, relative sector sizes and relative incomes moved oppositely, 
suggesting that under the progressive Christian Democratic government and later under 
the Socialist government of  Salvador Allende, nominal rigidities in formal sector wage 
                                                 
1 The exchange rate is defined as the price of non-tradables relative to tradables P
n/P
t  which can be shown 
to map into the more standard exchange rate adjusted ratio of price indices EP*/P under most conditions. 
The real exchange rates for Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Mexico are displayed in Figure 1 in the 
Appendix A. 
 
2 It should be noted that  Calvo and Vegh  show that backward looking price behavior can explain the 
stylized facts only if the intra-temporal  elasticity of substitution between traded and non traded goods is 
smaller than the intertemporal rate elasticity of substitution which they find implausible.     4
setting did, in fact, lead to a segmented labor market.  However, during the period of 
exchange rate appreciation of 1975-1982,  the two series move together, suggesting that 
the currency movements were not driven by backward indexing of formal sector wages. 
Further, the fact that the formal sector was expanding during this period suggests that a 
strong productivity shock to the formal sector may have been driving both labor force and 
exchange rate variables in a Balassa-type effect.    
For two other important cases, Mexico and Argentina, the appreciations  in 1988-
1993 and 1988-94 respectively occur simultaneously with increases in informal non-
tradables sector and relative wages suggesting a largely desirable expansion of the 
informal non-tradables sector and hence a “real” appreciation of the exchange rate.
3 In 
these cases, possibly increases in demand for non-tradables may have provided the initial 
impetus to appreciation.  The nascent negative co-movements after 1991 in Mexico offer 
potential evidence  that after the first four years of appreciation, there were  formal sector 
rigidities that were only resolved with the nominal depreciation.   At this point,  the still 
negative but now inverted comovements of relative wages and sector sizes suggests the 
recovery from a period of significant segmentation.  The behavior in Argentina seems 
less clear cut although it suggests a similar story- the appreciation of the ER is 
accompanied by positive wage/sector size comovement suggesting, again, a boom to the 
non-tradables sector. The secular increase in informal work in Brazil (figure 1d) after 
1987 concomitant with a secular rise in the relative wage in the sector also suggests that 
this evolution was desirable for many workers and this seems broadly concomitant with 
the real exchange rate appreciation across the latter half of the period, again consistent 
with a non-tradable demand led view. 
  Finally, very sharp negative co-movements in Colombia at the end of the 1990s 
suggest strong rigidities in the labor market leading to very large rationing out of workers 
from the formal sector. The sharp real exchange rate beginning in 1995 may reflect this 
inertial behavior which the nominal depreciation at the end of the period helped offset. 
For the countries where the data permit, Brazil and to a lesser extent Mexico and 
Colombia, the more systematic empirical work of the second half of the paper confirms 
these initial views.  
                                                 
3 See Maloney (1998)   5
 
2. A  Model   
We consider the case of a small economy that produces two composite goods, 
tradables and non-tradables. The formal sector is assumed to produce tradables (T), the 
numeraire, while the production of non-tradables is concentrated in the informal sector 
(N). All workers are homogenous when salaried in the formal sector. However, workers 
in the informal sector are self-employed and following Lucas, individuals (j) differ in 
terms of entrepreneurial capability, fj  distributed uniformly on [0,1]. For simplicity, we 
also  normalized the labor force to unity so that,  provided that the economy is not in a 
corner solution, the value of entrepreneurial ability of individual m, who is indifferent 
between salaried work and self-employment, also corresponds to the size of formal labor 
force. We set fm = f*. Then, f* = LT..  This effectively maintains the usual labor supply 
constraint, but builds in a decrease in marginal entrepreneurial ability as labor shifts 
toward self-employment.  
Formal output  T Y  is given by constant-returns production functions of the capital 
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Production of individual j in the self-employment sector is given by 
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We assume that capital is mobile both internationally and across sectors but not 
instantaneously. Capital markets are not perfect for the informal and, as Evans and 
Jovanovic demonstrated for the US, entrepreneurs are often credit constrained.  Those 
entering self-employment must install some capital the period before producing and pay a 














c , where  Ij  
represents the change in capital stock between two successive periods for self-employed   6
individual j and c is inversely related to the speed of adjustment. ( ) j k h  is a linear function 
of capital accumulated by the individual self-employed  j. We further assume that 
individuals willing to leave self-employment must dispose of all the capital they have in 
place before they become employed in the formal sector. However, due to imperfect 
capital markets, they face symmetrical adjustment costs.  This specification ensures that 
(de)installation costs are always finite. Further, since marginal costs of capital installation 
are increasing, capital adjustment will not happen instantaneously.  Labor is allocated 
only mobile between the two sectors and as will be shown,  since the entrepreneur must 
install capital before moving, labor also does not adjust fully within one period and 
differentials in net remuneration among sectors are not instantly arbitraged by labor 
flows.  This permits us to analyze both steady state movements in relative wages, relative 
sector sizes and exchange rates, but, also transitional dynamics. 
4 As to labor, it can 
migrate only between sectors within the economy.  
 
2.1 The firm 
The representative formal sector firm maximizes 
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where wT,s is the wage (gross) prevailing in the tradables sector at time t=s. The world 
interest rate r, expressed in terms of tradables, is assumed to be constant. 
Let us define the capital-labor ratios in traded goods production as kT = K T /LT , and re-
write outputs per employed worker as yT =AT f(kT).  The first order conditions are given by: 
 
( ) r k f A T T = '                     (1) 
( ) ( ) [ ] T T T T T w k k f k f A = - '                 (2) 
                                                 
4 As usually assumed, one unit of tradables can be transformed into a unit of capital at no cost. The reverse 
is also true. Non tradables can be used only for consumption. Capital can be used for production and then 
consumed (as a tradable) at the end of the same period.  
   7
Because  r is the world interest rate expressed in terms of tradables, it must correspond to 
the marginal product of capital in the formal sector as indicated by equation (1). Equation 
(2) simply states that the wage prevailing in the sector equals labor marginal productivity. 
Because both factors do not shift instantaneously across sectors, equations (1) and (2) 
may fail to hold ex-post in the event of  unanticipated shocks. 
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The first order condition is given by 
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where q denotes the shadow price of installed capital in non-tradables and p denotes the 
price of non-tradables relative to the price of tradables. In other words, p is simply the 
inverse of the real exchange rate defined as the relative price of traded goods in terms of 
non-traded goods. Equation (3) indicates that investment is positive only for values of q 
larger than 1. Equation (4) is a standard investment Euler equation.  It must also be true 
in the long run for all self-employed individuals that returns to capital equal the market 
rate of interest 
r k pA
N
j N j N =
-1 a a f                 (4’) 
and that the pivotal individual is indifferent between wage work and self-employment, we have 
 
( ) T N N w k pA
N = -
a f a * * 1  
   8
2.2 The Consumer 
As is standard, we assume that the economy is inhabited by an infinitely-lived 
representative consumer whose demands and asset holdings are identified with aggregate 
national counterparts and who maximizes a lifetime utility function of the form  







t C C u U , b . 
Where  T C  and  N C  stand for consumption in the tradables and non-tradables sectors, 
respectively,  ( ) N T C C , F  is a linear homogenous function of its arguments and u(.) is 
isoelastic with intertemporal substitution elasticity s. The representative consumer faces 
a lifetime budget constraint 
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where national financial wealth  t T t N t t K K B Q , , + + =  is measured in terms of tradables 
and B stands for net aggregate holdings of foreign assets. f* i s the ability of the 
individual who is indifferent between self-employment and wage work. We will be more 
precise about the latter definition below. IN,s represents total investment and KN,s total 
capital accumulated in the informal sector at date s. 
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relative intratemporal consumption depends only on the relative price p and not upon 
consumer's spending level where g  indicates the weight of the tradable good in the utility 
function.     Moreover, 
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A rise in non-tradables relative price induces a rise in tradables consumption growth 
relative to non-tradables consumption growth. Note that if s = q, tradables consumption 
remains constant along the perfect foresight paths. 
Since, by assumption non-tradables can only be consumed, in equilibrium 
consumption equals production in the informal sector. Substitution and combination of 
the Euler equation for tradables consumption with the lifetime budget constraint of the 
representative consumer yields an expression for the optimal consumption of tradables 
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where P is the price index P = 
q q g g
- - - +
1 / 1 1 ] ) 1 ( [ p ] which is increasing in p. 
 
2.3 Responses to Productivity and Demand Shocks 
 
Before turning to the dynamics of the economy, we first describe its steady state 
equilibrium and assess the impact of permanent productivity and consumption shocks. 
We then introduce a wage rigidity in the formal sector.  The results of all exercises are 
tabulated in Table 1.  
 
2.3.1 Shocks in the Long Run 
 
Productivity shocks are represented by a permanent variation in the A productivity 
scale coefficients and demand shocks by a permanent variation in the g parameter. In the   10







). Log differentiation  
leads to the following results, assuming that initially p = 1 and initial g is equal to one 
half.  
The real exchange rate: Differentiating (4’) and aggregating across all j gives 
( ) 0 ˆ ˆ 1 * ˆ ˆ ˆ * = = - - + + r k A p N N a f  
Although individual ability remains constant by assumption,  0 ˆ = j f  and hence the capital 
growth rate is the same for everyone, the labor reallocation after a shock results in a 
change in the pivotal individual so that  * ˆ f  is no longer equal to zero for the labor force 
as a whole.  By the same logic  
T N N w k A p ˆ ˆ * ˆ ˆ ˆ * = + + + a f  
where  j k k ˆ ˆ
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 close to 1, 
the real exchange rate is determined by the relative rates of productivity growth.  
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In order to simplify the analysis we assume that total financial wealth remains constant 
across steady state. We implicitly assume that any variation in the total level of physical   11
capital is fully offset by an equal variation of opposite sign in foreign assets holdings.   
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Changes in non tradables consumption can be written as   
( ) ( )p Z C N ˆ 1 ˆ
^ ^
g qg g - + - + - =  
and changes in  total production in the informal sector by 









Since non tradable goods market equilibrium requires that  N N Y C ˆ ˆ = ,  the entrepreneurial 
ability of the pivotal worker, and implicitly, the share of the workforce in tradables, can 
be written as   
 









- - + - - - + - + + - W - = q g q g a j j
h
g f 1 1 ˆ 1 1 1 1
ˆ
ˆ * ˆ




where  ( ) [ ]
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Relative Earnings: The change in  informal production expressed in tradables 
units is now 







































2 . The relative change in total production also corresponds to 
the relative variation in entrepreneurs earnings (denoted by wNj thereafter) as the latter is 
a constant proportion of the former.   12
The change in average informal production (entrepreneurs earnings) expressed in 
terms of tradables units can be written as: 
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f
. It is straightforward to verify that  2 3 W < W . 
 
Productivity Shock to the Formal/Tradables Sector 
In the case where  0
^
> T A ,  0
^
= N A  and  0
^
= g , consistent with Balassa-
Samuelson, the real exchange rate appreciates - non-tradables become more expensive 
relative to tradables. Both sectors become relatively more capital intensive and as a 
consequence net earnings are higher. The direction of change of the employment share of 
self-employment depends on the sign of  ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 1 1 1 1 - - - + - + q g a j j N se LT . It is 
unambiguously negative when  q  ‡ 1  and labor flows toward the formal sector and  
0 * ˆ > f .  However, for smaller values of  q, the wealth effect may prevail over the 
substitution effect and both consumption of non-tradables and employment in the 
informal sector may increase in levels. A sufficient condition for observing  0 * ˆ > f  for 
any q > 0 is given by   
 
( ) ( )( ) 1 1 1 - - > - - g a j j N LT se              (8) 
 
As by definition g is smaller than 1 then, condition (8) is always satisfied.  Total informal 
production, measured in tradables units, depends on the sign of 
   13
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] [ ] 1 1 1 1 1
ˆ







In the case of Cobb-Douglas preferences, it is straightforward to see that 
( ) [ ] 1 1 1 1 0 2 < - + - - W - < g a j j N se LT  for values of   2 W  close enough to unity, and the 
total value of informal production increases. Since  2 3 W < W , this is also true for average 
production and thus average entrepreneurs earnings. The reason is twofold. First the price 
of non-tradables increases and second, only the most able entrepreneurs remain in the 
informal sector. For larger values of  2 W  and  3 W  and or  g then the expression into 








ˆ = ,  on average self-employed 
earnings fall relative to workers earnings in the formal sector for any value of  2 W ,  3 W  
and q.  
In sum, for any positive value of q , we expect to observe relative earnings and 
relative sector sizes to positively co-move. In addition they  move with the real exchange 
rate.    
 
Productivity Shock to the Informal/Non-Tradables Sector 
In the case where  0
^
= T A ,  0
^
> N A , and  0
^
= g  the real exchange rate decreases in 
proportion  to the productivity shock in non tradables and neither capital intensity nor 
self-employed earnings are affected. The impact on informal employment is determined 
by the sign of  ( ) ( ) q g - - 1 1 , which is positive for any positive value of the intra-temporal 
elasticity of substitution. In all situations average earnings and participation rate in the 
informal sector increase relative to their counterpart in the tradables sector and move 
together although they move against the real exchange rate.   
However, it is hard to identify a case with a negative non-tradables productivity shock 
against the mainstream case of a strong positive shock to tradables, for instance, in the 
case of Chile 1979-82 although the boom in real estate and construction across that 
period (see Conley and Maloney 1995) weighs in favor of the latter.       14
 
Shift in Preferences toward Non-Tradables 
A shift in preferences, for example, towards non-tradables consumption  0
^
= T A , 
0
^
= N A  and  0
^
< g  increases self-employment as well as absolute and relative 
consumption of non-tradables. Absolute and relative average earnings of the self-
employed increase while wages in the formal sector remain at their initial level. Again, 
we observe co-movements in relative sector sizes and returns. In the long run, there is no 
change in the real exchange rate although, as we discuss below,  this is not true in the 
short run. 
 
Negative Formal/Tradables Productivity Shock  with Formal Sector Wage Rigidities 
Unions or mandatory minimum wages may introduce downward wage rigidities 
in the formal sector that can reverse many of the findings above.  A negative shock to 
productivity in the tradables sector translates into wage downward pressures in the formal 
sector. However, as this cannot occur, labor must migrate to the informal sector. Because 
capital returns are tied to the world interest rate, the outflow of labor in the formal sector 
is more pronounced than in the flexible case. This outflow  corresponds to 
( ) 0 * ˆ
ˆ
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Equilibrium of the demand and supply conditions in the non-tradables sector 
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which is negative for any q > 0  as is  
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As labor migrates towards the informal sector, production rises, the real exchange rate 
depreciates, and average earnings in the informal sector fall. Moreover, as workers 
cannot migrate back to the formal sector, those whose entrepreneurial ability is relatively 
low earn less than what they would get in the formal sector. For those workers “trapped” 
in the informal sector earnings performance has worsened relative to those employed in 
the formal sector as earnings in the formal sector are preserved by institutional rigidities.  
With the exception of  the implausible case where  g g j q / ) ( - < se  , the two labor force 
series move against each other.  Critically, the same result would hold in the case where 
indexation of wages to past inflation forces formal sector wages above equilibrium: we 
should see relative sector sizes and incomes move against each other.   
   
2.3.2 Short Run Equilibrium and Dynamics 
The adjustment to the steady state may depend on the relative values of s    and q  
although the previous section showed that long run properties of the economy are 
exclusively dictated by the absolute value of  q.   To simplify, we start with the case 
where q =s =1 and then refer to alternative parameterizations. To refresh, s >q implies 
that tradables consumption reacts more to variations in the gross real interest rate
6 
induced by a variation in the relative price of non-tradables than to the variation in the 
relative price itself.  
Linearizing equations (3) and (4)  around the steady state  1 = q ,  j k  we obtain 
( ) j
t







= - +                 (3’) 
                                                 
6 The gross real interest rate denoted by 
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The equations Dkj = 0 and Dqj = 0 are depicted in a two-equation phase diagram in q and 
kj that shows the dynamics of self-employed individuals investment decisions (figure 2). 
The perfect foresight path is indicated by the line denoted by SS.  
As the steady level of investment chosen by each individual is not identical, we 
expect to observe that a common shock affects differently heterogeneous individuals 
differently. Should a shock lead to contraction of the self-employment sector, those 
whose entrepreneurial ability falls below the threshold steady state value of  f* (those 
who would be better off in the wage work sector), the perfect foresight path leads to zero 
capital and a zero capital shadow value at steady state as depicted in figure 3. Should 








0  independently of the 
wage prevailing in the formal  sector since the initial shadow value of their capital is 
above one ( q0=1/r ). 
Inter-sectoral worker movements are not expected to be simultaneous because of 
entrepreneurial ability heterogeneity across individuals. More able individuals are the 
first to enter self-employment and the last to leave it. A sketch proof of these results is 
presented in appendix A. 
 
Productivity Shock to the Formal/Tradables Sector 
Production of tradables increases and so do labor and capital returns, leading to 
increased demand for both types of goods and causing p to rise to clear the non-tradables 
market. Along the perfect foresight transition path, some self-employed find it more 
profitable to move to the formal sector. As a consequence the shadow value of the capital 
they use at the end of the period following the shock falls short below 1 and tends to zero 
in the long run, and they decumulate capital. Those whose sequence of returns from self-
employment remains above that of the formal wage face  q>1 and they accumulate more 
capital.    17
On impact, no adjustment can take place because formal firms must wait for the 
following period to adjust their capital and self-employed can migrate only once the 
capital they have in place at the moment of the shock has been completely dismantled, 
that is not before the following period. Then, prices are the only adjustment element. On 
impact,  ( ) ( )
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a j g qg a
a j
- - + -
-
= , which corresponds to the initial rise in 
p. It can be shown that average self-employed earnings at steady state are lower than the 
level they reach on impact while the opposite is true for the formal wage. Then along the 
perfect foresight transition path, average earnings in the informal sector are expected to 
fall relative to wage changes in the formal sector. As condition (8) is always satisfied, the  
informal share is also expected to fall, as indicated in the previous section. Moreover, 
along the adjustment path, both sectors become more capital intensive, production in 
tradables increases unambiguously and the real exchange rate appreciates. Then, towards 
the long run wT / wN increases, LT / LN  falls and p rises relative to its initial level. Price 
overshooting and opposite movements of earnings and participation in the informal sector 
could never be observed. The relative ranking of  s  and q  may affect the length of 
adjustment but preserve dynamics and long run properties. Indeed, CT,t is given by (7) 
which suggests that the level of tradables consumption along the saddle path is affected 
by variations in p in a manner that could either reinforce or offset the impact of a shock.  
The impact of a rise in p on consumption bundles is dampened by consumers’ 
inter-temporal considerations in the case where s >q  and amplified in the opposite case. 
In the former case, consumption of non-tradables falls less rapidly relative to 
consumption in the tradables than in the case where s < q. This implies that migration 
occurs over a longer period of time when inter-temporal substitution considerations 
prevail over intra-temporal substitution considerations. 
 
Productivity Shock to the Informal/Non-Tradables Sector 
Again dynamics are driven by the importance of inter-temporal relative to that of 
intra-temporal considerations. On impact the real exchange rate is expected to fall to 
offset the positive productivity shock in order to keep the non-tradables market in 
equilibrium. However, the expected fall in p leads to a rise in demand for non-tradables.   18
This rise in demand increases as q  takes higher values relative to s. That is, for s < q we 
observe some undershooting of p along the transition path. Undershooting describes the 
fact that p falls to the level that offsets the impact of the productivity shock only when the 
economy reaches its new steady state. Whenever,  s >  q  consumption of tradables 
increases as p falls. The positive impact on the demand for non-tradables is smaller than 
in the previous case. This implies that the real exchange rate undershooting is less 
pronounced during the transition to the steady state than in the previous case. In other 
words, when s < q adjustment is expected to take place over a shorter period  than in any 
other situation. 
From previous section findings we have that at steady state, neither capital intensity nor 
self-employed earnings are affected on an individual basis. This implies that self-
employed individuals already in place at the occurrence of the shock, do not modify their 
capital stock as indicated by equations (3’) and (4’). Nevertheless, they increase their 
production as the initial real effect of the technological shock is positive. They return 
progressively to their pre-shock level of production as migration takes place. 
 
Shift in Preferences toward Non-Tradables 
On impact, the real exchange rate appreciates, relative informal earnings rise, and 
the shadow value of capital increases.  This attracts new entrepreneurs to the sector, 
expanding non-tradables supply and the relative price of non-tradables begins to return to 
its initial, relative productivity determined level.  Again the adjustment is more rapid 
when s > q and slowed in the opposite case.  This represents an important case where 
both   wT / wN  and LT / LN  fall concomitant with an exchange rate depreciation, and then 
an appreciation.   
 
Negative Formal/Tradables Productivity Shock with Formal Sector Wage Rigidities 
Because of downward wages rigidity, consumption levels are not affected on 
impact and p is not affected. However, released labor from the formal sector now flows 
to the non-tradable sector increasing its production, driving down p, and reducing average 
self-employed earnings. At the end of the first period, the tradables labor market is re-
equilibrated and outflow of capital again equalizes the marginal productivity of capital to   19
the world interest rate. For those self-employed already in place, the fall in p observed 
along the transition path, leads to capital decumulation. This effect is stronger in the case 
where s > q and q > 
g
g j - se .  In the symmetric case, we would still observe capital 
withdrawal from the informal sector but of a smaller size. Indeed, the non-tradables’ 
relative price can rise on impact
7, which slows down the path of capital decumulation in 
that sector. As a consequence, average earnings in the self-employment sector increase in 
the long run.  
Nevertheless this result should be regarded as a particular case. In the general 
case, those workers “forced” to become self-employed, even when on their optimal 
production path, are stuck in a position with earnings below the formal wage. Along the 
transition towards steady state, average earnings in the informal sector have fallen 
relative to the formal salary while the size of self-employment has increased. 
 
3. Methodology and Empirical Results:  
The analysis above makes two important points.  First, using very standard 
models, it is clear that theory implies relationships between our labor market variables 
and the real exchange rate. Second, independent of skill heterogeneity and adjustment 
costs, under no conditions can we generate a counter movement of relative sector sizes 
and earnings in the absence of a wage rigidity. This implies that any appreciation 
attributed to inertia or rigidities in the formal sector must be associated with opposing 
movements in sector size and earnings.  Third,  even in the absence of wage rigidities, the 
correlations between the real exchange rate and labor market variables will depend on the 
relative magnitudes of intra and intertemporal elasticities.  
   In this section, we use the multivariate Johansen approach (1988) to explore 
possible cointegration relationship in these three variables with the aim of establishing 
the degree of dualism in the labor market and driving force behind exchange rate 
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movements Mexico, Brazil and Colombia.
8,9 Although cointegration is sometimes given 
the economic interpretation of capturing “long run” relations, fundamentally it is a 
statistical relationship existing among non-stationary series.  In our case, both relative 
sector sizes and the real exchange rate can plausibly be posited as I(1) and they always 
appear to be so in the analysis.  Changing aggregate skill levels postulated in section 2 
suggest no reason to assume the wages ex ante to be I(0) and even if they were, a slow 
adjustment process could lead to apparent non-stationary behavior within the sample 
analyzed.
10 
We then use recursive cointegration estimation techniques to explore the stability 
of the cointegration space over time and we apply LR-test  to test hypotheses on the 
coefficients of the cointegration vectors in order to provide empirical evidence to test the 
various predictions of the model and to extract some conclusions about labor market 




We use quarterly data for Mexico, Brazil and Colombia on the log-transformed 
real exchange rate, p , the wage ratio of formal over self-employed workers, WT/WN, and 
the ratio of the absolute size of formal over the self-employed sector,  nT/nN. Real 
exchange rates where taken from IFS, all labor market data were derived from national 
labor force surveys (Pesquisa Mensual do Emprego for Brazil, Encuesta Nacional de 
Empleo Urbano for Mexico and Encuesta Nacional de Hogares , Colombia). The work 
force was defined as only the active male population. Because we are interested in 
informal workers and not educated workers opening consulting firms, all workers with 
more than 12 years of education were dropped from the sample.  
We use as a definition of informal self-employment either that size is under 6 total 
workers, or that the worker is not registered with social security.  We might also, 
                                                 
8 The statistical concept of a long-run equilibrium underlying cointegration analysis refers to the existence 
of a stationary relationship among two or more non-stationary time series.  
9 Appendix B contains a brief overview of the multivariate cointegration approach of Johansen (1988). 
10   Theoretically, however, it is legitimate to include an I(0) variable in the cointegrating relationship, 
although we would expect at least one cointegrating vector to emerge that captures simply the stationary 
series.  In practice, these series were never stationary across our sample and the problem was moot.   21
following Loayza (1995) focus on evasion of taxes or other regulations although in 
practice these different dimensions of “informality” are highly correlated and would 
probably change the analysis little.
11   
In viewing the data, it is worth mentioning that even if remuneration between the 
two sectors were equilibrated, these would include all monetary and  non-monetary 
remuneration (independence, benefits foregone, taxes avoided, implicit returns to capital, 
etc.).  Thus, even though in most of the countries the informal self-employed appear on 




3.2 Empirical Analysis 
We estimate separate VAR models for Mexico, Brazil and Colombia. The VAR 
models include a constant in the cointegration space, different lags for p, WT/WN  and 
nT/nN  as well as country specific dummies and these specifications prove sufficient to 
produce random errors.
 13 The  l trace tests indicate one significant cointegrating vector in 
all three models (Table 2). Normalizing the cointegration vectors on the 1
st element, 
yields the following estimates for the bs (Table 3) and a s (Table 4)
14:  
The adjustment coefficient of  D nT/nN  is strongly insignificant for Mexico and 
borderline significant in the case of Brazil and Colombia. This indicates weak exogeneity 
of nT/nN and thus provides evidence that nT/nN is driving the system, while WT/WN  and p 
are adjusting to disturbances in the long-run equilibrium. 
 
                                                 
11   Levenson and Maloney (1998) argue that formality, conceived as participation in social institutions 
(social security, judicial, taxes payment, etc)  itself may be largely incidental- social participation in general 
can be seen as a normal good in the production function that is more desired as firms grow.  With growth  
firms may embrace 
12 See Maloney (1999) for more detail. 
13 The model specifications for the three models are presented in Tables 8 and 9 in the Appendix along with 
tests for long-run exclusion, stationarity and weak-exogeneity (Table 7). All variables appear to be non-
stationary and the diagnostics on the residuals of the system show the absence of autocorrelation and 
indicate normality. A sensitivity analysis for different lag lengths and with and without dummies further 
indicated robustness of the findings. 
14 Figures 14 to 16 display the recursive trace statistics and indicate stability of the unrestricted 
cointegration space.   22
3.3.1 Identifying the Cointegration Space 
Identifying the cointegration space in the present case translates to sequentially 
impose restrictions on the cointegration vectors guided by the theoretical considerations 
of the previous sections. We begin by putting no restrictions on the exchange rate, but 
focus purely on the evolution of the two labor market variables.  Effectively, referring to 
Table 1, we are testing between the first division between markets with or without wage 
rigidities. A test that a rise in relative formal employment is accompanied by a rise in 
relative formal wages ( integrated sector size/wage movement), is implemented by 
restricting the coefficient of the relative formal wage to –1. A hypothesis test that a 
relative rise in formal employment is accompanied by a decline in relative formal wages 
(segmented sector size/wage movement), is implemented by restricting the coefficient of 
WT/WN to 1. 
Table 5 presents the results for the whole sample.  For Mexico, the test of 
integrated markets can be strongly rejected while the test  for segmentation cannot be 
rejected. For Brazil, the hypothesis of integration cannot be rejected and the hypothesis of 
segmentation is rejected at the 1% level. In Colombia, the hypothesis of segmentation can 
borderline not be rejected but a hypothesis of integration across the whole period can be.  
However, recursive cointegration tests of the stability of the cointegration space 
suggest in all cases the possibility of different relationships for subperiods, consistent 
with the idea that nominal rigidities may bind in some periods and not in others. 
Operationally, the trace statistics are calculated initially over a base period and then 
recalculated for every new observation added until the end of the sample is reached.  
Mexico: Figures 4 and 6 show, for Mexico, the test of the hypothesis that the full 
sample estimate of  b , with the over-identifying restrictions (1, 1, *, *)
15 imposed, is in 
the space spanned by i b  in each sub-sample. The test-statistics have been scaled by the 
95% quintile in the 
2 c distribution such that unity corresponds to the 5% significance 
level. Since the plot of the test statistics is above unity prior to roughly 1995,  the 
hypothesis of segmentation is only accepted from 1995 onwards.  A recursive test of the 
hypothesis of integration (expressed in vector form as (1,-1, *, *)) is plotted in Figures 5 
                                                 
15 A * indicates that a variable has been left unrestricted.   23
and 7 and, as Figure 1 suggested, cannot be rejected prior to 1995. These tests confirm 
that in the recovery period leading up to 1995, the rise in the informal sector was largely 
due to greater attractions of the sector itself, and not to labor market rigidities.  
Brazil:  For Brazil, the data cannot reject integration across the entire period 
although there are some sub-periods where it is difficult to reject segmentation as 
suggested by  Figure 9.  
Colombia:  The recursive stability test for Colombia strongly supports the 
hypothesis of a segmented labor market post 1995 onwards and never supports the view 
of integration for any subsample.  This supports the view that the Colombian labor 
market does have some formal sector rigidities which were intensified in the post 1995 
period.  In particular, the  rise of the real minimum wage across the period, concomitant 
with a collapse in formal sector activity due, among other factors, a financial crisis would 
correspond very well to the story that emerges. 
 
3.3.2 Further Restrictions on the Cointegration Space 
In the previous section we have left the real exchange rate unrestricted. As our 
theoretical model shows that a real exchange  rate appreciation (depreciation) can be 
accompanied by an increase (decrease) in the relative informal sector size as well as an 
increase (decrease) in relative informal wages, further empirical support for our model 
would be to identify a vector of (1, -1, -1, *) in the cointegration space. We limit our 
analysis to the cases of Mexico and Brazil since we cannot reject segmentation in the 
labor market. 
For Mexico, we limit our estimation period in this section from the post 1987 
recession to the pre Peso crises (1988:01 to 1994:03). We cannot reject  the hypothesis 
test of (1, -1, -1, *)  at a conventional level of significance, that is, the real exchange rate 
appreciation in Mexico prior to the Peso crisis was accompanied by an increase in the 
relative informal sector size and an increase in relative wages. (Table 6).  This is 
consistent with a positive demand shock to non-tradables, perhaps the boom in 
construction during the period, driving the exchange rate in the short to medium term,  
and is inconsistent with the inertial view.  Although the cointegration relationship only 
falls apart after 1995, the cumulative nature of the statistics may hide an earlier   24
disequilibrium and the relationship does become less stable as we approach the crisis, 
consistent with the graphical evidence of segmentation appearing in 1992.    In this sense, 
Carstens and Gil-Diaz were correct that the appreciation was caused by real factors, but 
Dornbusch and Werner were correct that a nominal depreciation was in order in 1994. 
For Brazil we could not reject positive comovement of the relative sector size and 
the relative wages over the whole sample (see Table 5), though this relationship appears 
to be stable only from around 1990 onwards (see Figure 8). A test of a coefficient vector 
of (1, -1, -1, *) being part in the cointegration space is accepted at the 5 % level of 
significance for the whole sample. We cannot therefore reject the hypothesis that the real 
exchange rate in Brazil is, again, driven perhaps by a positive demand shock to non-
tradables. A recursive plot of the cointegration tests of (1,-1,-1,*) with the less restrictive 
test of (1, -1, *,*) of the last section superimposed is shown for the case of Brazil in 
Figures 12 and 13. Interestingly, both coefficient restrictions are stable from around 1990 
onwards although the increasing instability of the identified cointegration relationship 
and, visually, the divergence of the two labor series starting in 1995-96 may suggest a 




  This paper  has offered an integrated view of LDC labor market and exchange rate 
behavior.  Modifying the Rogoff-Obstfeld small economy model to include 
heterogeneous entrepreneurial ability and credit constraints to entering self-employment, 
it first generates a set of hypotheses about the comovement of relative sector sizes and 
earnings and the real exchange rate.    
  These patterns of comovement are then tested in a cointegration framework and 
we find two provocative results.  First, there is strong evidence in favor of the formal and 
informal sectors being integrated, rather than dual labor markets as customarily 
envisaged:  there is often strong comovement between relative sector sizes and earnings.   
This offers strong evidence in favor of the i dea of viewing informal self employment 
primarily as a voluntary non-regulated non-tradable entrepreneurial sector.  Much of the   25
increase in informality across the 1990s appears explainable by an increase in the relative 
attractiveness of the sector.  
  Second, we can explain the appreciations of the peso in Mexico from 1988-1991 
and the Brazilian Real from 1993-1996 without recourse to inertial stories.  Put 
differently, in both cases, a positive demand shock to non-tradables appears as a more 
likely explanation than one based on labor market rigidities. Graphical evidence suggests 
that similar “equilibrium” phenomena drove the initial appreciations of the Chilean Peso 
from 1978-1992 and Argentine Peso from 1988-1994. Colombia is the only case where 
there is evidence of labor market rigidities that may contribute to exchange rate 
appreciation.   That said, in almost all cases, there is a suggestion that, although the initial 
appreciations were not driven by rigidities, they were nonetheless unsustainable and that 
the nominal adjustments were eventually required.   
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Appendix A: Migration Timing 
 
Because we assume that the self-employed individual, who is willing to move to the wage-work 











































































































Labor could adjust within the first period following the shock. However, because individuals are 
non homogenous when producing in the informal  sector, the optimal time for leaving the latter 
may differ across workers. 
The Left Hand Side of the above expression is increasing with entrepreneurial ability. Namely, 
more able individuals earn more than less able ones. Then the opportunity cost of migrating to the 
formal sector at time t, without considering the direct migration costs corresponding to capital 
disinstallation, is increasing in the level of entrepreneurial capability. The last term of the RHS, 
which represents the present value of labor earnings in the formal sector is identical for all 
individuals at time t. However, the first term of the RHS is likely to be different. The sign of the 
partial derivative of the latter with respect to f




























If the above expression appears to be positive, that would imply that the cost of migrating to the 
formal sector at time is increasing with the level of entrepreneurial capability. If this is the case, 
then  the total cost of migration is unambiguously increasing with f
 j . As a consequence we may 
expect more able entrepreneurs to postpone their migration towards the wage sector with respect 
to less able ones. 
In the case of a shock leading to an expansion of the informal sector, migration can occur within 
the first period following the shock, even though capital accumulation may take more than a 
period because of installation costs. Individuals migrate at the end of period s whenever  
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Following arguments similar to those presented above, we can infer that more able entrepreneurs 
will leave the formal sector first, in order to "cash in" the expected earnings differential the 
soonest.   31
 
Appendix B: The Multivariate Cointegration Analysis of Johansen 
 
The Johansen procedure allows us to test for cointegration in a multivariate 
system./ Starting from an unrestricted vector autoregressive model (VAR), the hypothesis 
of cointegration is formulated as a hypothesis of reduced rank of the long run impact 
matrix  P (Johansen, 1988, Johansen and Juselius, 1990). The VAR is generated by the 
vector z t, which defines the potential endogenous variables of the model. Taking first 
differences of the variables, the VAR can be transformed into an error correction model 
D G D G D P S z z z z D IN t t k t k t k t t t = + + + + + - - - = - 1 1 1 1 0 ... , ~ ( , ) y e e    
where the estimates of  ) 1 ,..., 1 ( ), ... ( 1 - = - - - - = G k i A A I i i  describe the short run 
dynamics to changes in z t and  P = - - - - ( ... ) I A A i 1 captures the long run adjustments 
and D contains deterministic terms.  
Cointegration occurs in the case of reduced rank of  P. Only if the rank is reduced 
(r<n) is it possible to factorize  P into  P ( ') = ab  where  a  denotes the adjustment 
coefficients and  b the cointegration vectors. The cointegration vectors  b have the 
property that  b' zt is stationary even though zt itself is non-stationary.  
If the rank is reduced it is possible to interpret the VAR in first differences as a 
vector error correction model and to obtain estimates of  a  and  b via the reduced rank 
regression. Since the rank of  P is equal to the number of independent cointegration 
vectors and the rank of P is also equal to the number of non-zero eigenvalues, the test of 
cointegration thus amounts to a test for the number of non-zero eigenvalues. The trace 
statistics,l trace, is a non-standard distributed likelihood-ratio test, which is commonly 
used to determine the number of cointegration vectors, (Johansen, 1988). The trace 
statistic tests the null hypothesis that there are at most r cointegration vectors: 
H0:  i l =0, for i = r+1,..n 
where only the first r eigenvalues,  l , are non-zero against the unrestricted hypothesis 
that r = n.
16 
                                                 
16 The null hypothesis of at most r cointegration vectors implies that there are  n-r unit roots and, 
theoretically, n-r zero eigenvalues. This is because the hypothesis of cointegration is formulated as the 
reduced rank of  ' ab = P  and the full rank of  ^ ^ Gb a ' , where  a  and b are n· r matrices and  ^ a  and   32
It is now common practice to try to identify the cointegration space and we follow 
the approach outlined in Johansen (1992) and Johansen and Juselius (1994). In their 
approach,  a system is exactly or just identified if k = r - 1 restrictions are placed on each 
cointegration vector and the rank condition for generic identification is satisfied.
17   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
^ b are n·(n-r)  matrices orthogonal to  a  and  b . This allows us t hen to distinguish between  r 
cointegrating I(0) relations and n-r non-cointegrating I(1) relations.  
17 In the case of two cointegration vectors generic identification requires that the rank condition 
rank(R i' Hj) ‡ 1 for i, j = 1, 2 and i „j is fulfilled. Where Ri is the orthogonal complement of Hi, such that 
Ri and Hi are both of full rank and satisfy the conditions Ri 'Hi =0, Ri' b i = 0 and b i = Hi j i . Ri are p*k 
matrices and Hi are p*s matrices with k + s = p.  




    D ( wT / wN )  D( LT / LN )  Dp 
  DAT > 0    > 0  > 0  > 0 
Flexible Wage  DAN > 0 




Dg< 0    < 0  < 0 
0 >  
(oversh.) 
Wage Rigidities  DAT < 0  A > q   > 0  < 0  < 0 
    A < q   < 0  < 0  < 0, > 0 
           
Long Run           
  DAT > 0    > 0  > 0  > 0 
Flexible Wage  DAN > 0    < 0  < 0  < 0 
  Dg< 0    < 0  < 0  0 
Wage Rigidities  DAT < 0  A > q   > 0  < 0  < 0 
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Table 2 















l trace test             
r = 0  r > 0  55.80
*  40.56
*  36.45
*  35.10  31.88 
r  £  1  r > 1  12.08  19.68  6.43  20.17  17.79 
r  £  2  r > 2  4.04  6.05  1.69  9.10  7.50 
*Rejection at the 5% level of significance
18  
Table 3 
  Mexico  Brazil  Colombia 
  b   b   b  
nT/nN  1.000  1.000  1.000 
WT/WN  0.969  -0.637  2.846 
P  0.976  -0.356  -2.776 
Constant  -2.803  0.101  -4.811 
Table 4 
  México    Brazil    Colombia   
  a   t-stat.  a   t-stat.  a   t-stat. 
DnT/nN  0.028     0.531  -0.012  -0.212  -0.213  -1.750 
DWT/WN  -0.088     -3.393  0.572  3.841  -0.057  -1.961 
Dp  -0.250     -6.457  0.281  2.381  0.088  6.009 
Note: D indicates a variable in first differences. 
Table 5: Summary of Hypothesis Tests (whole sample) 
  Mexico  Brazil  Colombia 
Integrated 
(1,-1,*,*) 
2 c (1) = 15.42 
p=0.00 
2 c (1) = 1.87 
p = 0.17 
2 c (1) = 16.96  
p = 0.00 
Segmented 
(1, 1,*,*) 
2 c (1) = 0.04 
p=0.84 
2 c (1) = 7.26 
p=0.01 
2 c (1) = 5.13  
p = 0.02 
Table 6: Test of (1,-1,-1,*) being part of the cointegration space in different subsamples 
  México  Brazil 
Sample:  1988:01– 1993:04: 
2 c (2) = 4.35 , p=0.11 
1982:01 – 1998:02: 
2 c (2) = 5.06, p = 0.08 
                                                 
18 The Reinsel-Ahn small sample corrected critical value at the 10% level is 43.13 for Mexico, 39.53 for 
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Negative co-movements of relative wages 
and sector sizes 
Positive co-movements of relative wages 
and sector sizes 
 
Figure 4: Mexico 
 
Figure 5: Mexico 
 
Figure 6: Mexico – alternative base period 
 
Figure 7: Mexico – alternative base period 
 
Figure 8: Brazil 
Test of known beta eq. to beta(t)
1 is the 5% significance level










Figure 9: Brazil 
Test of known beta eq. to beta(t)
1 is the 5% significance level











Figure 10: Colombia 
 
Figure 11: Colombia 
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Figure 12: Brazil   (1,-1,*,*) versus (1,-1,-1,*) restrictions 
















Figure 13: Brazil   (1,-1,*,*) versus (1,-1,-1,*) restrictions [without dummies] 















Note: Difference between Figures 12 and 13 is that underlying model in Figure 13 is without dummies. 
Since critical values of the Johansen test are not strictly valid in the presence of dummies, this is a common 
sensitivity analysis. 
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Figure 14: Mexico: Recursive Trace Test: 
Figure 15 : Brazil: Recursive Trace Test: 
Figure 16: Colombia: Recursive Trace Test: 
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Model Specification Tests for the VAR models: 
Table 7: Tests for Long-Run Exclusion, Stationarity and Weak Exogeneity 
  México:  Brazil  Colombia 
Model Specification:  Lag length: 4 
Dummies: 1994Q4 (Peso Crises) 
Lag Length: 4 
Dummies: 1994Q2  
(Currency conversion from 
Cruzerio Real to Real) 
Lag Length: 2 
Dummies: 1992Q2  
(large adverse movements in nT/nN
between 1992Q1 and 1992Q3) 
Test for Long-Run Exclusion: LR-Test ( ) (
2 r c ) 
R  dgf  ) 5 (
2 c   nT/nN  WT/W N  P  C.  nT/nN  WT/W N  p  C.  nT/nN  WT/W N  p  C. 
1  1  3.84  16.97  10.54  26.06  12.6  7.44  6.87  4.51  0.3  21.58  11.25  12.81  20.6 
2  2  5.99  18.67  12.11  27.82  14.4  13.27  10.16  4.85  1.1  23.38  13.13  15.27  23.1 
Test for Stationarity: LR-Test ( ) (
2 r p- c ) 
r  dgf  ) 5 (
2 c   nT/nN  WT/WN  P    nT/nN  WT/WN  p    nT/nN  WT/WN  p   
1  3  7.81  37.96  38.52  35.22    11.61  11.85  8.35    28.18  27.76  28.96   
2  2  5.99   2.74  3.28   2.87    3.65  4.28  0.77    2.91  2.50  4.10   
Test for Weak-Exogeneity: LR-Test ( ) (
2 r c ) 
r  dgf  ) 5 (
2 c   nT/nN  WT/WN  P    nT/nN  WT/WN  p    nT/nN  WT/WN  p   
1  1  3.84  0.57  12.06  21.22    0.28  6.29  2.48    2.83  3.33  24.83   
2  2  5.99  1.92  12.49  22.03    7.90  11.97  2.50    3.00  5.48  25.95   
 
Table 8: Multivariate Statistics (Residual Analysis) 
  México:  Brazil  Colombia 
Information Criteria:       
SC  -15.90  -15.40  -13.37 
HQ  -16.95  -16.21  -13.85 
Autocorrelation        
Ljung-Box:  2 c (63) = 74.3, p-value = 0.16 
2 c (11) = 140.8, p-val. = 0.01 
2 c (99) = 129.5, p-value = 0.02 
LM(1)  2 c (9) = 7.09, p-value = 0.63 
2 c (9) = 16.9, p-value = 0.05 
2 c (9) = 7.6, p –value = 0.58 
LM(4)  2 c (9) = 9.7, p-value = 0.38 
2 c (9) = 4.4, p-value = 0.88 
2 c (9) = 7.9, p –value = 0.54 
Normality  2 c (6) = 9.14, p-value = 0.17 
2 c (6) = 10.1, p-value = 0.12 
2 c (6) = 31.5, p-value = 0.00 
 
Table 9: Univariate Test Statistics (Residual Analysis) 
  Mexico      Brazil      Colombia 
  nT/nN  WT/WN  p  nT/nN  WT/WN  p  nT/nN  WT/WN  p 
Skewness  0.8483  -0.4627  0.0814  -0.3984  0.1036  0.7109  0.2750  -0.1402  -0.014 
Kurtosis  4.1049  3.3300  3.2463  2.6781  2.2688  3.4843  5.8000  4.3100  3.8161 
ARCH  2.4730  0.8230  9.9090  11.1260  1.2360  2.9560  4.3170  2.7780  3.3060 
Normality  5.7730  2.2730  1.4720  2.4550  1.2400  5.6900  19.6240  7.6740  4.4030 
R
2  0.2330  0.5250  0.8130  0.3760  0.4470  0.4980  0.4050  0.3840  0.4110 
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